

H
Action~~SECRET~~Control: 22890
Rec'd: AUGUST 30, 1961
8:16 PM

002

SS
Info

FROM: PARIS

EYES ONLY

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 240, AUGUST 30, 9 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY

IN MY TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT ON AUGUST 25 HE ASKED ME TO WRITE HIM MY IMPRESSIONS AS TO ATTITUDE OF NATO ALLIES ON DESIRABILITY AND FORM OF NEGOTIATIONS BY WEST WITH RUSSIANS ON BERLIN QUESTION.

I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD HAVE FOLLOWING LETTER DELIVERED TO PRESIDENT.

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

WHEN I HAD THE PLEASURE OF SEEING YOU ON AUGUST 25, YOU ASKED ME TO WRITE YOU MY IMPRESSIONS AS TO THE ATTITUDES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ON THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS ON BERLIN.

SINCE RETURNING TO PARIS ON AUGUST 27, I HAVE BEEN SOUNDING OUT INFORMALLY VARIOUS PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AND HAVE ALSO BEEN DISCUSSING THE PROBLEM WITH MEMBERS OF THIS MISSION, NOTABLY MESSRS. DURBROW, LEVY, WOLF AND GEOFFREY LEWIS, WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE ATTITUDES OF THE VARIOUS DELEGATIONS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL.

MY CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE ATTITUDES OF NATO MEMBER GOVERNMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"**EYES ONLY**

DECLASSIFIED
EX-95-1
By <i>MDM</i> NARA Date <i>12/95</i>

~~SECRET~~

-2- POLTO 240, AUGUST 30, 9 PM, (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM: PARIS

1. THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE HAS WELCOMED ENTHUSIASTICALLY THE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE BERLIN CRISIS. THE PRESENTATION BY SECRETARY RUSK AT THE AUGUST 8 NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING MADE AN EXCEPTIONALLY FAVORABLE IMPRESSION.

THERE ARE, HOWEVER, SOME FLIES IN THE OINTMENT. THE RESPONSE ON THE MILITARY SIDE HAS AS YET BEEN INADEQUATE. AND THE FIRST REACTION TO OUR ECONOMIC COUNTER MEASURES PROPOSALS WAS BAD. MOREOVER, THERE IS A UNIVERSAL VIEW (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FRANCE) THAT OUR MILITARY BUILD-UP HAS NOT BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY ENOUGH EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. THE UNANIMOUS OPINION, EXCEPT FOR FRANCE, IS IN FAVOR OF IMMEDIATE STEPS LOOKING FORWARD TO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBSTANCE, TO START NO LATER THAN THE DAY AFTER THE GERMAN ELECTIONS.

INDEED THE FRENCH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, M. DE LEUSSE, HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT FRANCE IS IN FAVOR OF NEGOTIATIONS THE MOMENT THE CURRENT THREATENING ATTITUDE OF THE RUSSIANS IS ENDED AND THEY SHOW SOME WILLINGNESS TO TALK SENSIBLY. THE FRENCH ATTITUDE, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, IS THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO ANNOUNCE THEIR BELIEF IN NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE AS SOON AS THE PRESSURE IS OFF; AND THEY WOULD MAKE THIS ANNOUNCEMENT NOW.

2. ALTHOUGH FAVORING EARLY NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIANCE IS UNANIMOUS, AND THIS INCLUDES FRANCE, THAT WHEN WE DO NEGOTIATE THE ALLIANCE MUST HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THERE SHOULD BE A FORMAL AGREEMENT OF FIXED POSITIONS, BUT RATHER THAT THE QUADRIPARTITE POWERS SHOULD HAVE REACHED A CONSENSUS AS TO WHAT THE BROAD LINES OF OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION SHOULD BE, AND THAT THIS CONSENSUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND APPROVED BY IT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- POLTO 240, AUGUST 30, 9 PM, (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM: PARIS

I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT IF THIS FORMULA IS ADOPTED, THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL CAN BE PERSUADED TO FOLLOW THE LEADERSHIP OF THE QUADRIPARTITE POWERS. HOWEVER, THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED ONLY IF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IS GIVEN THE CHANCE TO DISCUSS THE THINKING OF THE QUADRIPARTITE POWERS BEFORE A CONSENSUS IS FINALLY ADOPTED BY THEM.

IN THIS CONNECTION, ONE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE SAID TO ME, IN EXPLAINING THE REASONS FOR BELIEVING THAT SUCH A CONSULTATION WITHIN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL WAS NECESSARY, THAT AS OF NOW THERE WAS NO SOLIDARITY ON THE BERLIN QUESTION IN THE COUNCIL AND THAT HE FEARED THAT UNLESS FULL OPPORTUNITY FOR CONSULTATION WERE GIVEN TO THE COUNCIL, THERE WOULD BE NO SOLID FRONT IN THE ALLIANCE ON THE SUBJECT. THIS MAY BE PUTTING IT TOO STRONGLY, BUT I THINK THE STATEMENT IN SUBSTANCE IS CORRECT.

3. MANY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN THINKING OF THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION SHOULD BE. TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY HAVE DEVELOPED VIEWS, THEY SEEM TO BE UNANIMOUS THAT WE SHOULD START BY ASKING FOR WHAT WE WANT RATHER THAN LETTING THE RUSSIANS MAKE THE FIRST ITEM ON THE AGENDA THE QUESTION OF WHAT THEY ARE GOING TO GET. THE UNANIMOUS VIEW, I THINK, OF ALL THE MISSIONS IS THAT WE SHOULD INSIST ON A REAFFIRMATION OF THE UNDOUBTED RIGHT OF ACCESS OF THE WEST TO WEST BERLIN FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TRAFFIC BY AUTOBAHN, BY RAIL AND IN THE AIR CORRIDORS; THAT THESE WESTERN RIGHTS SHOULD BE SPELLED OUT IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL SO THERE CAN BE NO POSSIBLE DOUBT ABOUT THEM IN THE FUTURE; AND THAT THE WHOLE ARRANGEMENT SHOULD BE GUARANTEED BY THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT.

IN THIS CONNECTION, ONE INTERESTING (ALTHOUGH OBVIOUS) SUGGESTION WAS MADE BY ONE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, NAMELY THAT WE SHOULD GET NEGOTIATING ON THIS QUESTION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4- POLTO 240, AUGUST 30, 9 PM, (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM: PARIS

BEFORE THE RUSSIANS SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH THE EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT, BECAUSE ONCE THE RUSSIANS HAVE DONE THAT THEY WILL BE ALMOST FORCED TO TAKE THE POSITION THAT THEY CANNOT GIVE ANY GUARANTEES ABOUT ACCESS SINCE THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE A MATTER FOR THE EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT ONLY BY REASON OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE PEACE TREATY.

4. WHEN IT COMES TO THE QUID PRO QUO AS TO WHAT THE RUSSIANS WILL ASK FOR, THE CONSENSUS SEEMS TO BE THAT WE MUST CONSIDER TWO TYPES OF PROBLEMS; FIRST, ACTIONS WHICH THE RUSSIANS CAN TAKE ON THEIR OWN WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, AND, SECONDLY, ACTIONS THEY WILL WANT US TO TAKE FOR THEIR BENEFIT.

FINLETTER

ELP/22

H

Action

~~SECRET~~Control: 22969
Rec'd:

SS

Info

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 240, AUGUST 30, 9 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY

5. FIRST, AS TO ACTIONS WHICH THE RUSSIANS CAN TAKE, WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT. THE FIRST OF THESE IS, THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE TREATY. SOME OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES HAVE MADE THE POINT THAT WE SHOULD PREPARE WORLD OPINION TO THE END THAT THE SIGNING OF SUCH A PEACE TREATY MUST NOT BE THOUGHT OF AS A MAJOR POLITICAL VICTORY FOR THE RUSSIANS AND A CORRESPONDING MAJOR DEFEAT FOR THE WEST.

THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WHO HAVE BEEN MAKING THIS POINT GIVE AS ONE EXAMPLE WHERE BROAD PREPARATION OF WORLD OPINION SHOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE PAST THE RECENT CLOSING THE ACCESS ROUTES TO WEST BERLIN FROM EAST GERMANY AND EAST BERLIN. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY THEY SAY THIS HAS BEEN CONSIDERED AS A MAJOR VICTORY FOR THE RUSSIANS WHEN IN FACT IT IS A DREADFUL CONFESSION OF COMMUNIST WEAKNESS; AND THE SUGGESTION IS THAT WE SHOULD HAVE PREPARED WORLD OPINION FOR THIS POSSIBILITY BY APPROPRIATE STEPS IN ADVANCE, SUCH AS MAKING APPEAL TO KHRUSHCHEV NOT TO TAKE THIS DREADFUL STEP OF JILTING THE EAST GERMANS IN THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM BUT RATHER, IN THE NAME OF HUMANITY, TO RESPECT THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WERE MADE IN THE PAST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BERLIN AS A CITY UNDER JOINT RUSSIAN AND WESTERN CONTROL. THESE APPEALS, IT IS SAID, COULD HAVE BEEN MADE IN SUCH

A WAY AS

~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~—SECRET—~~

-2- POLTO 240, AUGUST 30, 9 PM, FROM PARIS (SECTION TWO O

A WAY AS TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THE CLOSING OF THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WOULD HAVE BEEN NOT ONLY ILLEGAL BUT AN INHUMAN ACT REVEALING THE WEAKNESS OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM.

FOR THE FUTURE THESE CRITICS SAY WE MUST PREVENT THE SAME THING FROM HAPPENING WHEN MR. KHRUSHCHEV SIGNS THE PEACE TREATY. APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE IN ADVANCE TO APPEAL TO MR. KHRUSHCHEV, IN THE INTEREST OF REDUCING TENSIONS AND OF LESSENING THE CHANCES OF WAR, NOT TO ENGAGE IN THE FRAUDULENT BUSINESS OF PRETENDING THAT EAST GERMANY IS A WHOLLY INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT, AND POINTING OUT THAT THE ONLY EFFECT OF SUCH AN ACTION CAN BE TO STRAIN RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND BE ONE MORE STEP TOWARD THE CREATION OF A CLIMATE FAVORABLE TO WAR -- OR SOMETHING LIKE THIS WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF TRYING TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THE SIGNATURE OF A PEACE TREATY WOULD BE A SIGN OF WEAKNESS OR OF TRICKERY BY THE RUSSIANS RATHER THAN BEING A POLITICAL DEFEAT FOR THE WEST.

IN SHORT, ANTICIPATION OF THE EVENTS LIKELY TO HAPPEN SHOULD BE CAREFULLY THOUGHT OF AS PART OF A GENERAL CAMPAIGN TO APPEAL TO WORLD OPINION TO BRING PRESSURES IN OUR FAVOR AND AGAINST THE SOVIETS IN THE FUTURE MANEUVERS WE MAY ANTICIPATE FROM THE RUSSIANS IN CONNECTION WITH BERLIN.

6. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THERE IS UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT AGAINST ANY DE JURE RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY, ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE GOVERNMENTS FEEL THAT IN THE FUTURE THIS MAY BECOME INEVITABLE.

THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF TALK ABOUT DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF THE EAST GERMANS, ALTHOUGH I CANNOT FIND OUT WHAT

THIS MEANS.

~~—SECRET—~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- POLTO 240, AUGUST 30, 9 PM, FROM PARIS (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

THIS MEANS. IN PRACTICAL TERMS I THINK THE ALLIANCE MEMBERS MEAN THAT WE HAVE TO CONTINUE TO ALLOW THE EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO EXERCISE A FORMAL CONTROL OVER CIVILIAN TRAFFIC ON THE GROUND FROM THE WEST TO WEST BERLIN; THAT WE MAY EVEN HAVE TO FACE UP TO AN EXTENSION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE FORMAL CONTROL OF MILITARY ACCESS ON THE GROUND TO WEST BERLIN (PRO FORMA STAMPING OF DOCUMENTS AND NOTHING MORE); BUT THAT WE MUST INSIST ON NO INCREASE IN THE CONTROL OVER AIR TRAFFIC (CIVILIAN OR MILITARY), AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE TREATY. HOWEVER, SOME OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONCEDE THAT AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE TREATY EAST GERMAN AUTHORITIES MIGHT EXERCISE A CONTROL OVER CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AIR TRAFFIC TO WEST BERLIN PROVIDED THE CONTROLS WOULD NOT BE ANY GREATER THAN THE MINOR FORMALITIES NOW BEING APPLIED BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES.

7. THE GENERAL SENTIMENT SEEMS TO BE THAT WE SHOULD NOT EMBARRASS OUR WEST GERMAN ALLIES BY ACCEPTING THE ODER-NEISSE LINE AS THE EASTERN BORDER OF GERMANY; ALTHOUGH THE OPINION SEEMS TO BE WIDESPREAD THAT THIS BOUNDARY IS AN UNCHANGEABLE FACT AND WILL HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED SOME DAY OR OTHER.

8. THERE SEEMS TO BE A GENERAL FEELING THAT THE PROPAGANDA FROM THE RADIO STATIONS IN WEST BERLIN IS SOMETHING WHICH WE MIGHT CONSIDER STOPPING IN EXCHANGE FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO DISCONTINUE RADIO EMISSIONS IN EAST BERLIN.

9. THERE IS SOME SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF THE IDEA OF M. SPAAK THAT THE WEST SHOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ABANDONING THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST AS A BASIS FOR ITS TRI-POWER OCCUPATION OF WEST BERLIN IN EXCHANGE FOR A FREE CITY CONCEPT GUARANTEED BY THE RUSSIANS, BY THE

THREE OCCUPYING

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4- POLTO 240, AUGUST 30, 9 PM, FROM PARIS (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

THREE OCCUPYING POWERS AND BY NATO, AND WITH THE PRESENT THREE-POWER TROOPS REMAINING IN WEST BERLIN AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WEST. THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT, I ASSUME, WOULD NOT AGREE TO THIS.

10. THERE IS LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANY ECONOMIC COUNTER-MEASURES THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN. THE ALLIANCE HAS NOT THOUGHT MUCH ABOUT THIS, BUT THEIR VIEWS TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY HAVE ANY ARE THAT, FIRST, SERIOUS ECONOMIC COUNTER-MEASURES AMOUNTING TO A TOTAL EMBARGO WOULD HAPPEN ONLY IF WE WERE PRACTICALLY IN A STATE OF WAR, AND, SECOND, THAT PARTIAL MEASURES WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON THE RUSSIANS OTHER THAN TO PRODUCE AN UNNECESSARY EXACERBATION OF TENSIONS AT A TIME WHEN WE WERE TRYING TO ACHIEVE JUST THE OPPOSITE.

WE IN THE MISSION ARE WORKING ON THIS PROBLEM. WE HAVE, I AM SORRY TO SAY, RUN INTO A GOOD DEAL OF TROUBLE ON THE EMBARGO, BUT WE ARE DIGGING IN OUR HEELS ON THIS AND ARE GOING TO INSIST ON IT. WE MAY BE APPEALING TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HELP THROUGH NEW MOVES BY OUR AMBASSADORS TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE HOME GOVERNMENTS.

SO FAR WE HAVE NOT REACHED DISCUSSIONS ON THE PARTIAL COUNTER-MEASURES IN OUR NATO-WIDE GROUP WHICH IS WORKING ON THE PROBLEM.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

THOMAS K. FINLETTER

END VERBATIM TEXT.

FINLETTER

LM

~~SECRET~~